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FOREWORD
SOVIET NUCLEAR TECHNOSCIENCE
Topography of the field and new avenues of research
In 1904, Frederick Soddy, who would later receive the Nobel Prize for his seminal 
studies in radiochemistry, speculated that the “new alchemists” who had unlocked 
the awe‑inspiring power of the atom would “turn wastelands green, melt the polar 
ice caps, and transform the planet into a friendly Garden of Eden.” But he also 
predicted that the state to possess the first viable atomic weapon would achieve 
world domination.1 The significance of nuclear technology, at once promising and 
terrible, shaped the following decades as the Atomic Age dawned. In 1972, the 
Soviet nuclear physicist and Nobel laureate Petr Kapitsa observed that modern 
science now had the ability “not only to annihilate but also to stimulate life at a 
global scale.”2 
The Cold War and nuclear power
The Atomic Age is a popular concept in the periodization of the 20th century.3 The 
advent of the Atomic Age is commonly dated to 1938, when Otto Hahn and Lise 
Meitner succeeded in splitting the uranium atom, or to 1945, when the first atomic 
bomb was detonated and nuclear physics’ age of innocence came to a sudden 
end.4 The philosopher Günter Anders, who wrote about the immorality of atomic 
1. Quoted in Spencer P. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), 4, 12.
2. Petr L. Kapitsa, Experiment, Theory, Practice: Articles and Addresses (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1980), 368.
3. See, for instance, Michael Salewski, ed., Das nukleare Jahrhundert: Eine Zwischenbilanz 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998); Karena Kalmbach, “Revisiting the Nuclear Age. State of the 
Art Research in Nuclear History,” Neue Politische Literatur, 62, 1 (2017): 49–70.
4. Roger H. Stuewer, The Age of Innocence: Nuclear Physics Between the First and Second 
World Wars (Oxford: University Press, 2018).
Cahiers du Monde russe, 60/2‑3, Avril‑septembre 2019, p. 257‑280.
258 FOREWORD
weapons, believed that a time was coming “in which at any given moment we have 
the power to transform any given place on our planet, and even our planet itself, 
into a Hiroshima.”5 The speculative anticipation of an atomic inferno created an 
atmosphere in which neither disarmament nor demobilization was possible and the 
“self‑sustained conflict”6 of the Cold War became a “radical age.”7 
This state of “organized peacelessness”8 increasingly came to shape research and 
development. The goal of the nuclear powers was not only to build weapons and 
disseminate knowledge. By waging a “brain warfare,” in which laboratories, lecture 
halls, and planning institutes were the “first line of defense,”9 they wanted to anchor 
Cold War thought and action in technology and science.10 Andrei Sakharov, the 
father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb and a later recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, 
wrote that many researchers and engineers understood themselves as “soldiers in a 
war of science and technology.” In this war, there “might not have been millions of 
dead on battlefields” but in its secret engineering offices and production facilities 
“the tension and in some cases the heroism was no less than during the years of 
the previous war.”11 As the Soviet rocket scientist Boris Chertok put it, the Cold 
War took place here “at the speed of a hot war.”12 Experts on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain justified the development of ever more efficient weapons of mass destruc‑
tion by clinging to the belief that because of their work, war would carry such a 
5. Günther Anders, “Commandments in the Atomic Age,” [1957] in Idem, Burning Conscience 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), 11‑20. See also Christian Dries, “‘Nukleare Zeit‑
bomben mit unfestgelegtem Explosionstermin’: Günther Anders und der Kalte (Atom‑)Krieg,” 
in Patrick Bernhard and Holger Nehring, eds., Den Kalten Krieg denken: Beiträge zur sozialen 
Ideengeschichte seit 1945 (Essen: Klartext, 2014), 63–87; Elisabeth Roehrlich, “To Make the 
End Time Endless: Günther Anders’ Fight against Nuclear Weapons,” in Günter Bischof, Jason 
Dawsey and Bernhard Fetz, eds., The Life and Work of Günther Anders: Émigré, Iconoclast, 
Philosopher, Man of Letters (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2014), 45–58.
6. Jost Dülffer, “Self‑sustained Conflict – Systemerhaltung und Friedensmöglichkeiten im 
Ost‑West‑Konflikt,” in Corinna Hauswedell, ed., Deeskalation von Gewaltkonflikten seit 1945 
(Essen: Klartext, 2006), 33–60.
7. Bernd Stöver, Der Kalte Krieg, 1947–1991: Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2007; reprint 2017).
8. Dieter Senghaas, Abschreckung und Frieden: Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit 
(Frankfurt am Main: Europa Verlagsanstalt, 1959).
9. Aaron Dennis: “Our First Line of Defense: Two University Laboratories in the Postwar 
American State,” Isis, 84 (1994): 427–455; Bernd Greiner, “Macht und Geist im Kalten Krieg: 
Bilanz und Ausblick,” in Tim B. Müller and Claudia Weber, eds., Macht und Geist im Kalten 
Krieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2011), 1–30.
10. Matthew W. Dunne, A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American 
Society (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013); Melissa Feinberg, Curtain of 
Lies: The Battle over Truth in Stalinist Eastern Europe (Oxford: University Press, 2017).
11. Andrej Sacharow, Mein Leben (München: Piper, 1991), 122–123. On Sakharov’s biog‑
raphy, see Gennady Gorelik, Andrej Sacharow: Ein Leben für Wissenschaft und Freiheit 
(Basel: Birkhäuser, 2013).
12. Boris E. Tschertok, Raketen und Menschen, Vol. 1 (Klitzschen: Elbe‑Dnjepr‑Verlag, 1998), 
15 and 344–345. 
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high price that waging one would become unthinkable.13 They understood the Cold 
War first and foremost as a grand game of chess in which players used cunning and 
mental effort to keep up with the other side.14 
Nevertheless, science and technology were more than the mere proxy battle‑
fields and intellectual arsenals of two competing systems locked in a seemingly 
irresolvable conflict. They also represented an “endless frontier”15 that developed 
into an important international arena for negotiating ideas about progress, peace, 
and the future. Once Hiroshima and Nagasaki opened Pandora’s box, scientists 
became diplomats, “communicators in the Cold War” who supported trust‑building 
measures and disarmament initiatives.16 Moreover, they endeavored to turn the 
apocalyptic fears that accompanied the overkill capacities of nuclear technologies 
into utopian hopes and preserve the idea of scientific progress as the savior of the 
modern era. In this way, they sought to convey the impression of leading humanity 
away from the abyss and toward paradise.17 
In 1946, the British journalist Harry Harper (1880–1960) euphorically 
announced the dawn of the “greatest age of all.” He believed that thanks to rocket 
propulsion technology people would soon explore the vast expanse of space, while 
nuclear technology would allow them to re‑engineer nature and show humanity 
13. Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 53–59. For a detailed account, see Sarah 
Bridger, Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2015).
14. Robert Bud and Philip Gummett, “Introduction: Don’t You Know, There’s a War on?,” 
in Idem, eds., Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain’s Defence Laboratories 
(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999), 3.
15. Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1945). For a biography of Bush, an influential American science administrator, 
see G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century 
(New York: Schuster & Schuster, 1997; reprint 2019) and Michael Aaron Dennis, “Recon‑
structing Sociotechnical Order: Vannevar Bush and US Science Policy,” in Sheila Jasanoff, ed., 
States of Knowledge: The Co‑Production of Science and Social Order (London: Routledge, 
2004), 225–253.
16. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Bernd W. Kubbig, Wissen als Machtfaktor im Kalten 
Krieg: Naturwissenschaften und die Raketenabwehr der USA (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 
2004); Kai‑Hendrik Barth, “The Catalysts of Change: Scientists as Transnational Arms Control 
Advocates in the 1980s,” Osiris, 21, 1 (2006): 182–206; Lawrence Badash, A Nuclear Winter’s 
Tale: Science and Politics in the 1980s (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); Ulrike Wunderle, 
Experten im Kalten Krieg: Kriegserfahrungen und Friedenskonzeptionen US‑amerikanischer 
Kernphysiker (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2015); Fabian Lüscher, “The Nuclear Spirit of Geneva. 
Boundary‑Crossing Relationships of Soviet Atomic Scientists after 1955,” Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte Osteuropas, 66, 1, (2018): 20–44.
17. Weart, Rise of Nuclear Fear; David Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1994; reprint 2007), 225–246; Dick van Lente, ed., The Nuclear Age in 
Popular Media: A Transnational History, 1945–1965 (New York: Palgrave, 2012); Mark 
Lipovetsky, “The Poetics of ITR Discourse in the 1960s and Today,” Ab Imperio, 14, 1 (2013): 
109–131; Stefan Guth, “One Future Only? The Soviet Union in the Age of the Scientific‑ 
Technical Revolution,” Journal of Modern European History, 13, 3 (2015): 355–376; Andreas 
Renner, “Globale Ikone des Kalten Kriegs? Der Atompilz und die sowjetische Nuklearkultur,” 
Osteuropa, 66, 6–7 (2016): 215–236.
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the way to its apotheosis.18 William L. Laurence, the only journalist to witness the 
Manhattan Project19 and the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, stated in the same year 
that atomic energy would bring “within sight the realization of the dream of the 
ages.”20 
In the mid‑1950s, the concept of the Atomic Age, along with that of the Space 
Age, became a popular term for describing the era.21 The idea brought with it norma‑
tive and predictive elements, including a specific vision of modernity based on the 
unconditional belief in the ability to achieve mastery over nature. In 1953, Presi‑
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower formally ushered in the Atomic Age in his “Atoms for 
Peace” speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. As 
the world watched, he proposed the creation of an “atomic energy agency” whose 
contributing powers would help countries build civilian nuclear programs provided 
that they agreed to forgo the development of nuclear weapons.22 Despite initial 
reservations, the USSR eventually endorsed Eisenhower’s proposal and in 1957 
became one of the founding members of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The path‑breaking agency was the institutional manifestation of the new 
Atomic Age. Brussel’s Atomium, built in 1958 as the landmark for the World Fair, 
was its impressive architectural representation.23
This special issue looks at the example of the Soviet Union and its successor 
states and examines the often ambiguous role of nuclear technology in the 
mobilization of modernity.24 To that end, it adopts a concept from recent 
18. Harry Harper, Dawn of the Space Age (London: S. Low, Marston, 1946), 5. 
19. The Manhattan Project was an American research undertaking created in 1942 to build an 
atomic bomb. See Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1986) and Bruce Cameron Reed, The History and Science of the Manhattan Project 
(Berlin: Springer, 2019).
20. William L. Laurence, Dawn over Zero: The Story of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Knopf, 
1946), 212.
21. Julia Richers, “Welt‑Raum: Die Sowjetunion im Orbit,” in Martin Aust, ed., Globalis‑
ierung imperial und sozialistisch: Russland und die Sowjetunion in der Globalgeschichte 
1851–1991 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2013), 400–424; Alexander C.T. Geppert, “Die Zeit 
des Weltraumzeitalters, 1942–1972,” in Alexander C.T. Geppert and Till Kössle, eds., Obses‑
sion der Gegenwart: Zeit im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 
218–250. 
22. See John Krige, “Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism, and Scientific Intelli‑
gence,” Osiris, 21 (2006): 161–181; Mara Drogan, Atoms for Peace, US Foreign Policy and the 
Globalization of Nuclear Technology, 1953–1960 (Albany: University at Albany, 2011); Mara 
Drogan, “The Nuclear Imperative: Atoms for Peace and the Development of U.S. Policy on 
Exporting Nuclear Power, 1953–1955,” Diplomatic History, 40, 5 (2016): 948–974. See also 
Mara Drogan’s article in this volume.
23. On the World Expo in Brussels, see Jochen Hennig, “Das Atomium: Das Symbol des 
Atomzeitalters,” in Gerhard Paul, ed., Das Jahrhundert der Bilder 1949 bis heute (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 210–217; Arthur P. Molella and Scott Gabriel Knowles, eds., 
World’s Fairs in the Cold War: Science, Technology, and the Culture of Progress (Pittsburg: 
University Press, 2019).
24. See Ian Welsh, Mobilising Modernity: The Nuclear Moment (London: Routledge, 2015).
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scholarship: nuclear modernity.25 The intention is not to make nuclear energy into an 
all‑encompassing signature of an era or into a certain form of modernity. Rather, 
the concept of nuclear modernity is meant to foreground the specific interrelation‑
ships between the development of nuclear energy, international politics, and soci‑
etal transformation that characterized the period. Those interrelationships made 
the Soviet Union a scientific and technological superpower and continue to have 
an effect on political culture, infrastructure, and everyday life. The forces and 
processes that accompanied the nuclear era significantly shaped the Soviet version 
of modernity. Not only did they bring about its rise; they also contributed to its 
collapse and, in the post‑Soviet era, influenced the technology policies of Russia 
and its neighboring states. This issue will take a closer look at the reciprocal rela‑
tionships and mutually reinforcing conditions of nuclear modernity at the global, 
imperial, and local levels. It will also explore how scientific practice related to over‑
arching categories of political and social thought together with the transnational 
circulation of people, artefacts, and ideas.26 
Science and technology studies (STS): new impetus, new challenges
This special issue follows the transdisciplinary work of science and technology 
studies (STS), an object of increasing attention in both academia and society at 
large for some time now. Amid urgent challenges such as global warming, advance‑
ments in biomedical technology, and increasing levels of digitalization, scholars 
have focused more on the relation of science and technology to societal struc‑
tures, cultural practices, and normative regimes. STS now represents a diverse, 
wide‑ranging field drawing on a rich spectrum of approaches that have given new 
impetus to research.27
What studies in STS share is the critical re‑examination of conventional 
theore tical models. The objective is to arrive at ways of thinking that focus on 
25. See Klaus Gestwa, “Katastrojka und Super‑GAU: Die Nuklearmoderne in Zeiten von 
Tschernobyl und Fukushima,” in Katja Kucher et al., eds., Stille Revolutionen: Die Neufor‑
mierung der Welt seit 1989 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2013), 57–68; Yu‑Fang Cho, 
“Remembering Lucky Dragon, Remembering Bikini: Worlding the Anthropocene through 
Transpacific Nuclear Modernity,” Cultural Studies, 33 (2018): 122–146; Gustav Cederlof, 
“The Revolutionary City: Socialist Urbanisation and Nuclear Modernity in Cienfuegos, Cuba,” 
Journal of Latin American Studies, 51 (2019): 1–24.
26. Gabrielle Hecht coined the term “nuclearity” to describe this phenomenon. See her Being 
Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 3–4.
27. See Sheila Jasanoff et al., eds., Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010); Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction in Science and Tech‑
nology Studies (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publ., 2010); Stefan Beck, Jörg Niewöhner and Estrid 
Sørensen, Science and Technology Studies: Eine sozialanthropologische Einführung (Bielefeld: 
Transcript, 2012); Christophe Bonneuil and Pierre‑Benoît Joly, Sciences, techniques et société 
(P.: La Découverte, 2013); Dominique Pestre, ed., Le gouvernement des technosciences: 
Gouverner le progrès et ses dégâts depuis 1945 (P.: La Découverte, 2014); Ulrike Felt et al., 
eds., Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017).
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interdependence and heterogeneity and that afford adequate space for the analysis 
of phenomena that are multiple and contingent. These ways of thinking deconstruct 
the traditional dichotomies of culture and nature, society and technology, life and 
matter as chimeras of modernity.28 This new perspective looks at the “social life 
of things”29 by “expanding the boundaries of the social.”30 This openness to things 
paves the way to a new theory of society in which the social world arises not only 
from discourse but also from the specific materiality of structures and practices. 
STS scholars call into question established interpretative frameworks and through 
productive provocation liberate new analytic potential. This new orientation had its 
beginnings in social constructivist approaches to science and technology studies, in 
laboratory ethnography, in actor‑network theory, in practice theory, and in the new 
theories of materialism.31
Work in these areas offers an alternative understanding of action and agency. 
It criticizes traditional concept of actors – people, social groups, and institutions 
– for a blatant “neglect of things.”32 Instead, it looks at the role of the “material 
participants of action”33 and the “governance of things.”34 The concepts of “agen‑
tial realism”35 and “vibrant matter”36 stress that human beings are by no means the 
measure of all things and the only constructors of the social world. The properties 
of technical devices and other objects affect the actions users can take with them. 
These properties, known as “affordances,” shape social interaction.37 Things also 
28. See Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes: Essai d’anthropologie symétrique 
(P.: La Découverte, 1991).
29. Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspectives, 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1986).
30. Georg Kneer et al., eds., Bruno Latours Kollektive: Kontroversen zur Entgrenzung des 
Sozialen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008).
31. For a good survey, see Susanne Bauer, Torsten Heinemann, and Thomas Lemke, eds., 
Science and Technology Studies: Klassische Positionen und aktuelle Perspektiven (Suhrkamp: 
Berlin, 2017).
32. Werner Rammert, “Was ist Technikforschung? Entwicklung und Entfaltung eines sozial‑
wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramms,” in Idem, ed., Technik aus soziologischer Perspek‑
tive 2: Kultur – Innovation – Virtualität (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), 18–19.
33. Stefan Hirschauer, “Praktiken und ihre Körper: Über materielle Partizipanden des Tuns,” 
in Karl H. Hörning and Julia Reuter, eds., Doing Culture: Neue Positionen zum Verhältnis von 
Kultur und sozialer Praxis (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2004), 73–91.
34. Thomas Lemke, “‘Die Regierung der Dinge’: Politik, Diskurs und Materialität,” Zeitschrift 
für Diskursforschung, 2, 3 (2014): 250–267; Hans Peter Hahn, ed., Vom Eigensinn der Dinge: 
Für eine neue Perspektive auf die Welt des Materiellen (Berlin: Neofelis, 2015).
35. Karen Barad, Agential Realism: On the Importance of Material‑Discursive Practices 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
36. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke Univer‑
sity Press, 2010).
37. On the term affordance, see Richard Fox, Diamantis Panagiotopoulos and Christina 
Tsouparopoulou, “Affordanz,” in Michael R. Ott, Rebecca Sauer and Thomas Meier, eds., 
Materiale Textkulturen. Konzepte – Materialien – Praktiken (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 63–70; 
Nicole Zillien, “Affordanz,” in Kevin Liggier and Oliver Müller, eds., Mensch‑Maschine‑In‑
teraktion: Handbuch zu Geschichte, Kultur und Ethik (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2019), 226–228.
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possess the ability to organize and develop according to their own dynamic. The 
often differing scripts underlying human actions, technical functions, and natural 
processes result in unforeseeable events and innovations. The emphasis on “thing 
power”38 dissociates the concept of agency from the conscious and the intentional 
and focuses on effectiveness, i.e. the enactment of action.39 
Separation is not an essential trait of the social world. Accordingly, the role 
that humans play among non‑human creatures and things can only be meaning‑
fully explained if human agency and the agency of things are studied in the same 
context. STS scholars remind us that agency dwells in collectives, configurations, 
or assemblages consisting of people, matter, and artefacts.40 It is necessary, they 
claim, that we replace the concept of “interaction,” which reflects the cooperation 
of clearly separate entities, with “intra‑action,” in which the inextricable entan‑
glement of diverse types of agents is axiomatic.41 Andrew Pickering speaks of 
a “dance of agency” in which the lead and the steps constantly change and the 
further course of the dance remains open.42
Bridging the gap: the socio‑technical premise and technoscience
Although overly theoretical at times, the metaphors and concepts outlined in 
the two preceding paragraphs provide a fruitful hotbed of ideas for historical 
research. The ever more precise focus on the junctures of science, technology, and 
society in “the seamless web”43 has recently led to a boom of conceptual bridges 
that think social practice and historical reality in combination. Sheila Jasanoff’s 
theory of “co‑production,” avoiding both simplified determinism and an over‑
reaching constructivism, inquires into complex causal chains.44 Compound adjec‑
tives such as “socio‑technical” and “socio‑natural” act in concert with nouns such 
38. Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 10.
39. On the concept of “enactment,” see Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in 
Medical Practice (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).
40. See, for instance, Kneer et al., eds., Bruno Latours Kollektive; Manuel DeLanda, Assem‑
blage Theory (Edinburgh: University Press, 2016); Naoki Ueno, Rieko Sawyer and Yuji Moro, 
“Reconstitution of Sociotechnical Arrangements: Agency and the Design of Artifacts,” Mind, 
Culture, and Activity, 24, 2 (2017): 95–109.
41. See Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement 
of Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007); Idem, Verschränkungen 
(Berlin: Merve, 2015).
42. See Andrew Pickering, “Material Culture and the Dance of Agency,” in Dan Hicks and 
Mary C. Beaudry, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies (Oxford: University 
Press, 2010), 191–208; Idem, “The Robustness of Science and the Dance of Agency,” in Léna 
Soler et al., eds., Characterizing the Robustness of Science: After the Practice Turn in Philos‑
ophy of Science (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 317–327.
43. This concept comes from Thomas P. Hughes, “The Seamless Web: Technology, Science, 
Etcetera, Etcetera,” Social Studies of Science, 16 (1986): 281–292.
44. See Sheila Jasanoff and Sang‑Hyun Kim, eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical 
Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago: University Press, 2015).
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as “systems,” “change,” “transition,” “sites,” and “imaginaries” to articulate the 
strong intertwinement of social life and things.45 Among the popular conceptual 
bridges is Sara Pritchard’s idea of “envirotechnical systems,” which describes the 
confluence of technical, scientific, political, and natural processes.46 
An especially important conceptual bridge for this issue is technoscience. It 
addresses (1) the interdependence of academics, economics, and the military in 
a “military‑industrial‑academic complex.”47 At the same time, it rejects (2) the 
distinctions between science and technology or basic research and applied science, 
respectively. Finally, it stresses (3) the rapidly increasing technologization of 
science. The production of new knowledge is predicated on increasingly elabo‑
rate infrastructures and procedures. As a result, costs for research and development 
have skyrocketed. At the same time, new arrangements have formed between the 
organic and the inorganic (through, say, the creation of genetically modified cells 
and living beings) and the artifacts of technoscience have progressively penetrated 
social life.48 For this reason, some have, not without controversy, declared it an 
epochal phenomenon.49
45. See Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in Socio‑
technical Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Pieter Vermaas et al., A Philosophy of 
Technology: From Technical Artefacts to Sociotechnical Systems (San Rafael, CA: Morgan & 
Claypool Publishers, 2011); Verena Winiwarter, Martin Schmid and Gert Dressel, “Looking 
at Half a Millennium of Co‑Existence: The Danube in Vienna as a Socio‑Natural Site,” Water 
History, 5, 2 (2013): 101–119; Simon Marvin et al., eds., Urban Living Labs: Experimentation 
and Socio‑Technical Transitions (London: Routledge, 2017).
46. See Sara Pritchard, Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Idem, “An Envirotechnical Disaster: 
Nature, Technology, and Politics at Fukushima,” Environmental History, 17, 2 (2012): 219–243; 
Idem, ed., New Natures: Joining Environmental History with Science and Technology Studies 
(Pittsburgh: University Press, 2013).
47. See Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military‑Industrial‑Aca‑
demic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Rebecca 
S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997).
48. The concept of technoscience underlines both Bruno Latour’s idea that technology is society 
made durable and the central role of artifacts in stabilizing heterogeneous arrangements. See 
Bruno Latour, “Technik ist stabilisierte Gesellschaft,” in Andréa Belliger and David J. Krieger, 
eds., ANThology: Ein einführendes Handbuch zur Akteur‑Netzwerk‑Theorie (Bielefeld: Tran‑
script, 2006), 369–398.
49. See Jutta Weber, Umkämpfte Bedeutungen: Natur im Zeitalter der Technoscience (Frank‑
furt am Main: Campus, 2003); Mikael Hård and Andrew Jamison, Hubris and Hybrids: 
A Cultural History of Technology and Science (New York: Routledge, 2005); Kristin Asdal, 
Brita Brenna and Ingunn Moser, eds., Technoscience: The Politics of Interventions (Oslo: 
Unipub, 2007); Mike Michael, Technoscience and Everyday Life: The Complex Simplicities 
of the Mundane (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2010); Bruce Braun and Sarah J. What‑
more, eds., Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Alfred Nordmann, Hans Radder and Gregor Schiemann, 
eds., Science Transformed?: Debating Claims of an Epochal Break (Pittsburgh: University 
Press, 2011). In 2014, Routledged launched its series History and Philosophy of Technoscience. 
It now comprises 20 volumes.
 SOVIET NUCLEAR TECHNOSCIENCE 265
The bourgeoning scholarship on the history of Russian/Soviet  
technology and science
It was only in the past two decades that studies of Russian and Soviet history began 
to figure in discussions of the interplay between technology, science, and society.50 
Works have appeared covering a broad range of topics, from celebrated scientists51 
and large‑scale projects52 to individual disciplines53 and important science towns.54 
Many have also included fruitful analyses of neighboring fields such as agrarian 
and environmental history.55 Recently, studies have paid special attention to the 
50. This is the view of the editors of Kritika. See their “Technopolitics and the Frontier of 
History,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 20, 4 (2019): 677–681 (677).
51. See Kendall E. Bailes, Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions: V.I. Vernadsky 
and His Scientific School, 1863–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); Torsten 
Rüting, Pavlov und der neue Mensch: Diskurse über Disziplinierung in Sowjetrussland 
(München: Oldenbourg, 2002); Daniel Todes, Ivan Pavlov: A Russian Life in Science (Oxford: 
University Press, 2014); Michael Gordin, A Well‑Ordered Thing: Dmitrii Mendeleev and the 
Shadow of the Periodic Table (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Paul R. Josephson, Lenin’s 
Laureate: Zhores Alferov’s Life in Communist Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
52. See Paul R. Josephson, “‘Projects of the Century’ in Soviet History: Large‑Scale Tech‑
nologies from Lenin to Gorbachev,” Technology and Culture, 36 (1995): 519–559; Matthew 
J. Payne, Stalin’s Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism (Pittsburgh: University Press, 
2001); Scott W. Palmer, Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern 
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Building of BAM and late Soviet Socialism (Pittsburgh: University Press, 2009); Klaus Gestwa, 
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1948–1967 (München: Oldenbourg, 2010); Johannes Grützmacher, Die Baikal‑Amur‑Magis‑
trale: Vom stalinistischen Lager zum Mobilisierungsprojekt unter Brežnev (München: Olden‑
bourg, 2010); Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, Russlands Fahrt in die Moderne: Mobilität und 
sozialer Raum im Eisenbahnzeitalter (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2014).
53. Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Nikolai Krementsov, International Science Between 
the World Wars: The Case of Genetics (New York: Routledge, 2004); Nils Roll‑Hansen, 
The Lysenko Effect: The Politics of Science (New York: Humanity Books, 2005); Eglė 
Rindzevičiūtė, The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened up the Cold War World 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016); Jan Arend, Russlands Bodenkunde in der Welt: Eine 
ost‑westliche Transfergeschichte 1880–1945 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017).
54. See Paul R. Josephson, New Atlantis Revisited: Akademgorodok, the Siberian City of 
Science (Princeton: University Press, 1997); Ksenia Tatarchenko, “Calculating a Show‑
case: Mikhail Lavrentiev, the Politics of Expertise, and the International Life of the Siberian 
Science‑City,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 46, 5 (2016): 592–632.
55. For a good survey of work on agrarian history, see Katja Bruisch and Klaus Gestwa, 
Land, Soil and People: Agricultural Expertise and Power, Special Issue, Cahiers du Monde 
russe, 57, 1 (2016). Subsequent helpful publications include Marc Elie and Carole Ferret, 
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rurales, 200 (2017): 64–79; Christian Teichmann, Macht der Unordnung: Stalins Herrschaft 
in Zentralasien 1920–1950 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2016); Julia Obertreis, Imperial 
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Erde: Der Kuban und der agromeliorative Komplex, 1929–1991 (Tübingen: unpublished 
dissertation, 2019).
On environmental history, see Douglas R. Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian 
Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); 
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Soviet space program.56 The history of computing has seen a noticeable upsurge in 
interest, too.57 
In many earlier works, the central underlying question had been the extent 
to which ideology and politics in the Soviet Union determined the development 
of science and technology. After scholars liberated themselves from the trench 
wars between the “totalitarian” and “revisionist” schools of thought, they could 
develop more nuanced historical interpretations. In particular, they found not only 
that Soviet state power exerted massive influence on science and technology but 
also that science and technology led to significant changes in politics, society, 
and economics.58 
Jonathan D. Oldfield, Russian Nature: Exploring the Environmental Consequences of Societal 
Change (London: Routledge, 2006); Stephen Brain, Song of the Forest: Russian Forestry and 
Stalinist Environmentalism, 1905–1953 (Pittsburgh: University Press, 2011); Paul Josephson 
et al., An Environmental History of Russia (Cambridge: University Press, 2013); Laurent 
Coumel and Marc Elie, eds., A Belated and Tragic Ecological Revolution: Nature, Disasters, 
and Green Activists in the Soviet Union and the Post‑Soviet States, 1960s–2010s, Special 
Issue, Soviet and Post‑Soviet Review, 40, 2 (2013); Jonathan Oldfield, Julia Lajus, and Denis 
J.B. Shaw, eds., Conceptualizing and Utilizing the Natural Environment: Critical Reflections 
from Imperial and Soviet Russia. Special Issue, Slavonic and Eastern European Review, 
63,1 (2015); Andy Bruno, The Nature of Soviet Power: An Arctic Environmental History 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2016); Nicholas Breyfogle, Eurasian Environments: Nature 
and Ecology in Imperial Russia and Soviet History (Pittsburgh: University Press, 2018); 
Melanie Arndt and Laurent Coumel, eds., The Green End of the Red Empire, Special Issue, 
Ab Imperio 20, 1 (2019).
56. See Asif A. Siddiqi, The Red Rockets’ Glare: Spaceflight and the Soviet Imagination, 1857–
1957 (Cambridge: University Press, 2010); Eva Maurer, Julia Richers, Monica Rüthers and 
Carmen Scheide, eds., Soviet Space Culture: Cosmic Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies (Basing‑
stoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); James T. Andrews and Asif A. Siddiqi, eds., 
Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration and Soviet Culture (Pittsburgh: University Press, 2011); 
Slava Gerovitch, Voices of the Soviet Space Program: Cosmonauts, Soldiers, and Engineers 
Who Took the USSR into Space (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Idem, Soviet Space 
Mythologies: Public Images, Private Memories, and the Making of a Cultural Identity (Pitts‑
burgh: University Press, 2015).
57. See Slava Gerovitch, “InterNyet: Why the Soviet Union did not build a nationwide 
Computer Network,” History and Technology, 24, 4 (2008): 335–350; Felix Hermann, “Zwis‑
chen Planwirtschaft und IBM. Die sowjetische Computerindustrie im Kalten Krieg,” Zeithis‑
torische Forschungen – Studies in Contemporary History, 9, 2 (2012): 212–230; Benjamin 
Peters, How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2016); Ksenia Tatarchenko, “‘The Computer Does Not Believe in Tears’: 
Programming, Professionalization and Gendering of Authority,” Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History, 18, 4 (2017): 709–739; Mario Biagioli and Vincent Lepinay, 
eds., From Russia with Code: Russian Computer Scientists Abroad (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2019).
58. See Kendall E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet 
Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941 (Princeton: University Press, 1978); Alexander Vucinich, 
Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1917–1970 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1984); Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton: University Press, 
1997); Loren Graham, What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian 
Experience? (Stanford: University Press, 1998); Paul R. Josephson, Totalitarian Science and 
Technology (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1996); Alexei B. Kojevnikov, Stalin’s 
Great Science: The Times and Adventures of Soviet Physicists (London: Imperial College Press, 
2004); Ethan Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars (Princeton: University Press, 2006).
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In an effort to better understand the societal transformation in the Soviet Union 
induced by science and technology, an increasing number of researchers have 
turned their attention to technopolitics, a concept pioneered by Gabrielle Hecht in 
her 1998 study of France’s nuclear history.59 Supplying the missing link between 
often separate fields of study, technopolitics is “the strategic practice of designing 
or using technology to constitute, embody, and enact political goals.”60 This prac‑
tice combines forms of expert knowledge with their materialization in (often 
impressive) artifacts. Studies investigating technopolitics focus on the researchers, 
engineers, planners, and inventors that built Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union.
Science and technology has long since stopped being unexplored territory 
in the expansive map of Russian/Soviet history, and researchers have already 
announced the discovery of its “technological DNA.”61 A recent issue of Kritika 
edited by Larissa Zakharova and Grégory Dufaud illustrates the richness and 
diversity that scholarship in this field has attained over the last few years.62 
However, to adequately represent the Russian/Soviet case in the international 
history of technology, we need additional in‑depth and theoretically nuanced 
studies on how mutually reinforcing constellations of science, technology, and 
policies enabled the transformation of nature and society in Czarist Russia and the 
Soviet Union.63
The dreams and disasters of Soviet nuclear history
The degree to which technology shaped the history of the Soviet Union was already 
apparent in the turmoil of the Russian Civil War. Lenin’s 1920 announcement that 
communism was “Soviet power plus electrification” elevated the ambitious plan 
of the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) to a “second 
party program.”64 This energetic worldview continued unaltered throughout the 
59. See Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity 
after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998; reprint 2009); Gabrielle Hecht and 
Paul N. Edwards, “The Technopolitics of Cold War: Toward a Transregional Perspective,” in 
Michael Adas, ed., Essays on Twentieth Century History (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2010), 271–314; Gabrielle Hecht, ed., Entangled Geographies: Empire and Techno‑
politics in the Global Cold War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).
60. Hecht, Radiance of France, 15.
61. Gestwa, Großbauten, 556.
62. Grégory Dufaud and Larissa Zakharova, eds., Science, Fiction and Power in the USSR, 
Special Issue, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 20, 4 (2019).
63. The most recent person to call for this was Grégory Dufaud. See his “The History of Science 
and Technology, or How to Grasp Heterogeneity,” ibid.: 813–822.
64. Vladimir I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 42 (M.: Izdatel´stvo Politicheskoi Liter‑
atury, 1970), 159. For a detailed study, see Jonathan Coopersmith, Electrification of Russia, 
1880–1926 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
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Cold War.65 Soviet officials in Moscow confidently announced that the Atomic 
Age would lead to a second global victory of communism. These nuclear dreams 
of Soviet modernity have already been surveyed.66 Researchers have also studied 
the military branch of the Soviet nuclear program, whose rapid successes ensured 
a thermonuclear balance of terror between the rival blocs.67 Moreover, informa‑
tive studies have appeared on the organizational structures of the Soviet nuclear 
complex and on Soviet nuclear cities.68 
The Chernobyl disaster on April 26, 1986, has been the object of much scholarly 
attention, especially after the events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
65. See Jeronim Perović, ed., Cold War Energy: A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas 
(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Felix Frey, Arktischer Heizraum: Das Energiesystem Kola 
zwischen regionaler Autarkie und gesamtstaatlicher Verflechtung, 1928–1974 (Köln: Böhlau, 
2019).
66. See Paul R. Josephson, “Atomic‑Powered Communism: Nuclear Culture in the Postwar 
USSR,” Slavic Review, 55, 2 (1996): 297–324; Idem, Red Atom: Russia’s Nuclear Power 
Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.H. Freeman & Co, 1999); Sonja D. Schmid, 
“Celebrating Tomorrow Today: The Peaceful Atom on Display in the Soviet Union,” Social 
Studies of Science, 36, 3 (2006): 331–365; Idem, “Shaping the Soviet Experience of the 
Atomic Age: Nuclear Topics in Ogonyok, 1945–1965,” in Dick van Lente, ed., The Nuclear 
Age in Popular Media: A Transnational History, 1945–1965 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), 19–51.
67. See David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 
1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris 
and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder: Routledge, 
1995); Michael D. Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic 
Monopoly (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).
68. On the Soviet nuclear complex, see Sonja D. Schmid, Producing Power: The pre‑ 
Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015); Idem, 
“Of Plans and Plants: How Nuclear Power Gained a Foothold in Soviet Energy Policy,” Jahr‑
bücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 66, 1 (2018): 124–139. 
On nuclear cities, see Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities and the Great 
Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: University Press, 2013); Anna Storm, 
Post‑Industrial Landscape Scars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Anna Veronika 
Wendland, “Inventing the Atomograd: Nuclear Urbanism as a Way of Life in Eastern Europe, 
1970–2011,” in Thomas Bohn et al., eds., The Impact of Disaster: Social and Cultural 
Approaches to Fukushima and Chernobyl (Berlin: EB Publishers, 2015), 261–287; Hiroshi 
Ichikawa, “Obninsk, 1955. The World’s First Nuclear Power Plant and ‘The Atomic Diplo‑
macy’ by Soviet Scientists,” Historia Scientiarum, 26 (2016): 25–41; Ekaterina Emeliant‑
seva, “Negotiating Coldness: The Natural Environment and Community Cohesion in Cold 
War Molotovsk‑Severodvinsk,” in Julia Herzberg, Christian Kehrt, and Franziska Torma, 
eds., Ice and Snow in the Cold War: Histories of Extreme Climatic Environments (New 
York: Berghahn, 2018), 261–292; Galina Orlova, “The Scientific Shape of a Nuclear City: 
Obninsk as an Assemblage of Research Institutes,” in Felix Ackermann, Benjamin Cope and 
Siarhei Liubimau, eds., Mapping Visaginas: Sources of Urbanity in Former Monofunctional 
Town (Vilnius: Vilnius Academy of Arts Press, 2016), 63–72; Roman Khandozhko, “Dissi‑
dence Behind the Nuclear Shield? The Obninsk Atomic Research Centre and the Infrastruc‑
ture of Dissent in the Late Soviet Union,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 66, 1 
(2018): 65–92; Stefan Guth, “Oasis of the Future: The Nuclear City of Shevchenko/Aktau, 
1959–2019,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 66, 1 (2018): 93–123.
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in March 2011.69 Scholars have since looked at other “nuclear landscapes” as well 
as changes to security regulations and radiation protection.70 
These studies explicitly address issues of ignorance, lack of knowledge, and 
surprise as important phenomena of nuclear modernity. Driven by strong socio‑eco‑
nomic and political interests, Soviet officials recklessly overlooked technologies’ 
dangers or downplayed the actual risks. Only after the unexpected became bitter 
reality in the form of unintended consequences did they begin to think more care‑
fully and seek out more knowledge, leading to new social interactions shaping 
experience and structures.71 
Most studies of Soviet nuclear history have concentrated either on the late 1940s 
and 1950s or the period after 1986. The German‑Swiss research group “Radiating 
Future? Nuclear Technopolitics in the Soviet Union” formed several years ago to 
explore the mostly overlooked interim period.72 The editors of the first publication 
69. See Thomas Bohn et al., eds., The Impact of Disaster; Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: 
Biological Citizens after Chernobyl (Princeton: University Press, 2002); Olga Kuchinskaya, 
The Politics of Invisibility: Public Knowledge about Radiation Health Effects after Cher‑
nobyl (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014); Edward Geist, “Political Fallout: The Failure of 
Emergency Management at Chernobyl´,” Slavic Review, 74, 1 (2015): 104–126; Aliaksandr 
Dalhouski, Tschernobyl in Belarus: Ökologische Krise und sozialer Kompromiss, 1986–1996 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2015); Melanie Arndt, ed., Politik und Gesellschaft nach Tscher‑
nobyl: (Ost‑)Europäische Perspektiven (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2016); Idem, Tschernobylkinder: 
Die transnationale Geschichte einer nuklearen Katastrophe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2020); Adam Higginbotham, Midnight in Chernobyl: The Untold Story of the World’s 
Greatest Nuclear Disaster (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019); Serhii Plokhy, Chernobyl: 
History of a Tragedy (London: Penguin, 2019); Kate Brown, Manual for Survival: A Chernobyl 
Guide to the Future (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2019).
70. Magdalena Stawkowski, “‘I Am a Radioactive Mutant’: Emergent Biological Subjectiv‑
ities at Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site,” American Ethnologist, 43, 1 (2016): 
144–157; Idem, “Everyday Radioactive Goods? Economic Development at Semipalatinsk, 
Kazakhstan,” Journal of Asian Studies, 76, 2 (2017): 423–436; Anna Veronika Wendland, 
“Reaktorsicherheit als Zukunftskommunikation: Nuklearpolitik, Atomdebatten und kerntech‑
nische Entwicklungen in Westdeutschland und Osteuropa 1970–2015,” in Christoph Kamp‑
mann, Angela Marciniak and Wencke Meteling, eds., “Security Turns Its Eye Exclusively to the 
Future”: Zum Verhältnis von Sicherheit und Zukunft in der Geschichte (Baden‑Baden: Nomos, 
2018), 305–352; Susanne Bauer, “Radiation Science After the Cold War: The Politics of Mea ‑
surement, Risk, and Compensation in Kazakhstan,” in Olga Zvonareva, Evgeniya Popova and 
Klasien Horstman, eds., Health, Technologies and Politics in Post‑Soviet Settings: Navigating 
Uncertainties (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 225–249; Susanne Bauer, Karena Kalm‑
bach and Tatiana Kasperski, “From Pripyat to Paris, from Grassroots Memories to Globalized 
Knowledge Production: The Politics of Chernobyl Fallout,” in Laurel MacDowell, ed., Nuclear 
Portraits: Communities, the Environment, and Public Policy (Toronto: University Press, 2017), 
149–189; Laura Sembritzki, “Maiak 1957 and its Aftermath: Radiation Knowledge and Igno‑
rance in the Soviet Union,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 66, 1 (2018): 45–64; and 
Idem, Nukleares Naturschutzgebiet im Süd‑Ural: Atommüllkatastrophen und Strahlenschutz in 
der Sowjetunion (Heidelberg: unpublished dissertation, 2019).
71. Peter Wehling, Im Schatten des Wissens? Perspektiven der Soziologie des Nichtwissens 
(Konstanz: UVK, 2006); Robert P. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger, eds., Agnotology: The 
Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford: University Press, 2008); Matthias Gross, Igno‑
rance and Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2010).
72. Funded by the Germany Research Foundation and the Swiss National Science Founda‑
tion, this research group consists of seven researchers, coming from the Universities of Bern, 
Heidelberg and Tübingen. These include the four editors of this special issue as well as Roman 
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based on the group’s work, an English‑language special issue of Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte Osteuropa, have demanded a more in‑depth study of the 1960s and 
70s, lest it remain a mere epilog to Stalin’s bomb projects or a mere prehistory of 
Chernobyl. Only after this gap in the research is closed will we be able to under‑
stand the long‑term effects of the Soviet nuclear program.73
As the research group’s second collective publication, this special issue further 
explores the topics for which the above‑mentioned volume prepared the field. It 
arose from an international conference organized in March 2018 at the University 
of Tübingen.74 The ten articles that make up this issue are arranged thematically 
into three sections, which we describe in detail below. 
Decentered perspectives on Soviet nuclear history
In the 1990s, the first studies on Soviet nuclear history viewed their subjects 
entirely through the lens of Moscow. This focus was reasonable in view of the 
Soviet Union’s highly centralized nuclear program.75 More recently, however, 
scholarship has turned its attention to the periphery of the Soviets’ vast nuclear 
program.76 This shift was the result of both practical factors – regional archives 
are generally easier to access than those in the capital – and methodological 
concerns.
In the past two decades, calls for decentered perspectives have become increas‑
ingly frequent in the social sciences, the humanities, and STS. The meaning of 
“decentered” is both geographical and societal, signaling a shift from the center 
to the periphery and from elites to subalterns.77 The nexus between geograph‑
ical and societal meaning has been especially pronounced in postcolonial studies, 
where researchers have often combined analytical programs with emancipatory 
agendas.
New studies of Russian and Soviet history have been particularly receptive to 
the call for geographical decentering. For one, they regard Russia and the Soviet 
Union in toto as the antithesis and a corrective to Western grand narratives that 
Khandozhko (Tübingen), Fabian Lüscher (Bern) and Laura Sembritzki (Heidelberg). For more 
information on the activities of this working group, see https://nuctechpol.org/ [last accessed 
on 21.12.2019].
73. Stefan Guth, Fabian Lüscher and Julia Richers, “Nuclear Technopolitics in the Soviet 
Union: An Introduction,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 66, 1 (2018): 3–19 (5–7). 
This introduction provides a good survey of the literature on Soviet nuclear modernity. We have 
thus kept our remarks on the literature brief.
74. A report by Timm Schönfelder on the Tübingen conference can be found at http://www.
hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte–7659 [last accessed on 21.12.2019].
75. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb; Josephson, Red Atom.
76. See the literature cited in n. 68.
77. See Natalie Zemon Davis, “Decentering History: Local Stories and Cultural Crossings in a 
Global World,” History and Theory, 50 (2011): 190.
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still dominate global history.78 For another, they have focused their attention on 
the borderlands of the Russian and Soviet empire, allowing a more comprehen‑
sive survey of the historical space while injecting ideas of the spatial and imperial 
turn in Russian/Soviet history.79 This change of perspective from the center to the 
periphery also reflects a shift in interests from structures to contexts.80 Accordingly, 
scholars have examined artifacts and practices less in terms of grand designs than in 
terms of local uses and adaptations.81
In the decentered view, the history of science and technology takes on great 
importance because the Russian/Soviet “conquest” (osvoenie) of space primarily 
took place as part of large‑scale energy, water, and transportation infrastructure 
projects.82 This issue’s first section, therefore, looks at the Soviet nuclear program 
from the perspective of its peripheries. More than other technologies, nuclear 
power sheds light on the Soviet “borderlands of industrial modernity.”83 The first 
strongholds of the Soviet nuclear weapons program were often located in remote 
areas for reasons of secrecy, resource availability, and environmental impact. Under 
Brezhnev’s leadership, nuclear colonization became a trusted means of incorpo‑
rating backwater regions into Soviet modernity.
78. See Maxim Waldstein and Sanna Turoma, “Introduction: Empire and Space: Russia and the 
Soviet Union in Focus,” in Idem, eds., Empire De/Centered: New Spatial Histories of Russia 
and the Soviet Union (Farnham: Routledge, 2013), 2. For a general view, see Martin Aust, 
ed., Globalisierung imperial und sozialistisch: Russland und die Sowjetunion in der Globalge‑
schichte 1851–1991 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2013); Idem and Julia Obertreis, eds., 
Osteuropäische Geschichte und Globalgeschichte (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013); Christof Dejung 
and Martin Lengwiler, eds., Ränder der Moderne: Neue Perspektiven auf die Europäische 
Geschichte, 1800–1930 (Köln: Böhlau, 2016).
79. On the spatial turn, see Manfred Sapper et al., eds., Der Raum als Wille und Vorstellung: 
Erkundungen über den Osten Europas, Special Issue, Osteuropa 55, 3 (2005); Mark Bassin, 
Christopher Ely, and Melissa K. Stockdale, eds., Space, Place, and Power in Modern Russia: 
Essays in the New Spatial History (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010); 
Karl Schlögel, ed., Mastering Russian Spaces: Raum und Raumbewältigung als Probleme der 
russischen Geschichte (München: Oldenbourg, 2011).
Since 2000, the journal Ab Imperio has risen to prominence for its imperial turn in historical 
studies of Eastern Europe, publishing path‑breaking special issues and essays.
80. See Barney Warf and Santa Arias, “Introduction: The Reinsertion of Space in the Human‑
ities and Social Sciences,” in Idem, eds., The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 1–10.
81. See Artemy M. Kalinovsky, “A Most Beautiful City for the World’s Tallest Dam: Interna‑
tionalism, Social Welfare, and Urban Utopia in Nurek,” Cahiers du Monde russe, 57, 4 (2016), 
819–846; Idem, Laboratory of Socialist Development: Cold War Politics and Decolonization 
in Soviet Tajikistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); Idem and Marianne Kamp, From 
Industrialization to Extraction: Visions and Practices of Development in Soviet Central Asia, 
Forum, Ab Imperio, 19, 2 (2018); Patryk Reid, Managing Nature, Constructing the State: The 
Material Foundation of Soviet Empire in Tajikistan, 1917–1937 (PhD Dissertation: University 
of Illinois at Urbana‑Champaign, 2016).
82. See the literature cited in n. 52 and 55.
83. Jonas van der Straeten, “Borderlands of Industrial Modernity: Explorations into the History 
of Technology in Central Asia, 1850–2000,” Technology and Culture, 60, 3 (2019): 659–687.
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In her essay for this issue, Anna Veronika demonstrates that “atomic‑powered 
communism” arose from an imperial program.84 Similarly, Stefan Guth, in exam‑
ining the western Kazakh nuclear city of Shevchenko (Aqtau), emphasizes the 
“frontier” character of nuclear colonization. Against the contrasting backdrop of 
this backwater desert peninsula, Soviet nuclear modernity could take center stage 
all the more effectively. Andrei Stsiapanau, writing about the efforts to build a 
nuclear power plant in Belorussia, observes that nuclear power in the 1980s had 
become an indispensable sign of participation in Soviet modernity.
These studies of the periphery keep a constant eye on the center in Moscow 
and its will to shape the Soviet Union. Wendland shows how the construction of a 
nuclear power plant in western Ukraine furthered Soviet interventionism by indus‑
trially reshaping rural areas and bringing thousands of Russian experts into a terri‑
tory that just two decades earlier was considered an insurgent border region. The 
same applied, as Stefan Guth argues, for western Kazakhstan, albeit with even less 
participation from the Soviet republic.
Nuclear development projects in the Soviet Union thus reproduced the discrep‑
ancy between an advanced center and a backward periphery that they purported 
to overcome. In her study on the global division of labor and risk allocation in 
the atomic age, Gabrielle Hecht describes the hierarchies between imperial elites 
and subaltern groups that accompanied it. Taking a postcolonial perspective, she 
points out that many of the most dangerous testing grounds and production sites 
of nuclear modernity were located in former colonial and quasi‑colonial spaces.85 
This was certainly true of the Soviet nuclear testing sites in Semipalatinsk, 
Kazakhstan, which Susanne Bauer examines in the third section of this issue. In a 
similar vein, following the nuclear disasters in Kyshtym in 1957 and in Chernobyl 
in 1986, the protection of local populations enjoyed less priority than that of the 
technological elite.86 Accordingly, the resistance to the Soviet overexploitation of 
social and natural resources came, to no small extent, from the periphery.87 After 
the collapse of the USSR, nationally tinged victimhood narratives emerged in 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. These narratives interpreted Soviet nuclear 
colonization as Russian foreign rule and categorized the radioactive sites left by 
the empire as a colonial legacy.
However, at the beginning of the millennium, nuclear energy began to undergo 
an astonishing re‑evaluation. While contaminated nuclear sites were still “external‑
ized” as an imperial legacy, the political elites of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
self‑confidently reclaimed the scientific and technological participation of their 
84. Josephson, “Atomic‑Powered Communism.”
85. Hecht, Being Nuclear, 8.
86. Sembritzki, “Maiak 1957”; Geist, “Political Fallout.”
87. Melanie Arndt and Laurent Coumel, “A Green End to the Red Empire? Ecological Mobili‑
zations in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1950–2000: A Decentralized Approach,” 
Ab Imperio 20, 1 (2019): 105–124; Gestwa, Großbauten, 500–555; Jane I. Dawson, Eco‑Na‑
tionalism: Anti‑Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1996).
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republics in the nuclear modernity acquired during Soviet times as part of their 
respective national awakening. This strategy was particularly understandable in 
Ukraine, which as Wendland observes contributed crucial intellectual and personal 
resources to the Soviet nuclear program and today has an energy system shaped by 
the nuclear power plants built during the Soviet era. Kazakhstan embraces nuclear 
energy on account of its status as the world’s largest exporter of uranium. For its 
part, Belarus constructed a new nuclear power plant in an effort to achieve energy 
autonomy. As with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, however, this strategy was under‑
mined by the country’s intense dependence on Russian expertise and technology. 
Even a quarter of a century after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its relation‑
ships between center and periphery live on.
Interdependencies across the blocs and the imperative  
of global presence
Several years ago, transnational and global history studies began to include the 
Cold War. Since then, a number of studies have questioned the metaphor of the 
“Iron Curtain” and its connotations of isolation, dichotomization and demoniza‑
tion.88 It is true that the Cold War and its rivaling powers divided humanity after 
1945 as rigidly as ever. At the same time, however, interdependencies across the 
blocs encouraged exchange at the transnational and global levels.89 The world of 
the Cold War was, as the title of one study put it, “divided, but not disconnec‑
ted.”90 In order to better address the resulting web of interrelations, scholarship 
must be liberated from the Procrustean bed of bipolarity shaped by Washington 
and Moscow. This means connecting the plotlines of the Cold War with those of 
modernization, decolonization, and globalization.91
The simultaneity of division and interdependence was what made the Cold 
War so complex. This is especially evident in the development of knowledge and 
88. On the history of this term, see Patrick Wright, Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War 
(Oxford: University Press, 2007).
89. For an East European perspective, see Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold 
War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2003); Patrick Major and Rana Mittler, eds., Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social 
History, Special Issue, Cold War History, 4, 1 (2003); Sari Autio‑Sarasmo and Katalin 
Miklóssy, eds., Reassessing Cold War Europe (London: Routledge, 2011); Simo Mikkonen and 
Pia Koivunen, eds., Beyond the Divide: Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe (New York: 
Berghahn, 2015); Simo Mikkonen et al., eds., Entangled East and West. Cultural Diplomacy 
and Artistic Interaction during the Cold War (Berlin: DeGruyter Oldenbourg, 2019).
90. Tobias Hochscherf, Christoph Laucht and Andrew Plowman, eds., Divided, but not Discon‑
nected: German Experiences of the Cold War (New York: Berghahn, 2010).
91. See Akira Iriye, “Historicizing the Cold War”, in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, 
eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 15–31; Akira 
Iriye, “Introduction,” in Idem, ed., Global Interdependence: The World after 1945 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 3–9.
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technology, where confrontation, competition, and cooperation existed side by 
side.92 An examination of the constantly shifting balance between these modes of 
interdependence can provide important insights about the role science and tech‑
nology played in international relations during the Cold War.93
Accordingly, the second section of this issue addresses the transnationalization 
of nuclear modernity and the imperatives of global presence that arose from it. 
This development began, as Mara Drogan explains in her essay, with the “Atoms 
for Peace” program that President Eisenhower announced in 1953. Characterized 
as an “Atomic Marshall Plan,”94 the program sought to bring the world’s nuclear 
market under Washington’s control. In response, the Soviet Union felt that it too 
must deploy nuclear diplomacy to create hegemonic relations and new inter‑
dependencies. Roman Khandozhko’s article on the Joint Institute for Nuclear 
Research (JINR) in Dubna argues that the Soviet Union established its own “inter‑
national oasis” in high energy physics in order to keep Eastern Bloc states close. 
Dubna was also a place in which scientists could exchange ideas with Western 
colleagues and receive new knowledge through shared research. Proving the 
saying that “nothing awakens the ambition of the heart more than the trumpets of 
foreign glory,” animosity and aversion as well as partnership and friendship forged 
ties between states during the Cold War.95
92. Greiner, Müller and Weber, eds., Macht und Geist; Klaus Gestwa et al., eds., Kooperation 
trotz Konfrontation: Wissenschaft und Technik im Kalten Krieg, Special Issue, Osteuropa, 59, 
10 (2009); Jeroen van Dongen, ed., Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of 
Knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Jenny Andersson and Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, eds., The Struggle 
for the Long‑Term in Transnational Science and Politics: Forging the Future (Abingdon: Rout‑
ledge 2015); Elena Aronova and Simone Turchetti, eds., Science Studies During the Cold War 
and Beyond: Paradigms Defected (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). The research group 
“Cooperation and Competition in the Sciences” at the University of Munich studies the tensions 
between cooperation and competition. For more, see https://www.kooperation‑und‑konkur‑
renz.geschichte.uni‑muenchen.de [last accessed on 21.12.2019]. 
93. For more on this field, see Kai‑Henrik Barth and John Krige, eds., Global Power Knowl‑
edge: Science and Technology in International Affairs, Special Issue, Osiris, 21 (2006); Naomi 
Oreskes and John Krige, eds., Science and Technology in the Global Cold War (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2014); Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes and Ruth Knoblich, eds., The 
Global Politics of Science and Technology, vol. 1 and 2, (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014); Charles 
Weiss, “How Do Science and Technology Affect International Affairs,” Minerva, 53 (2015): 
411–430; Birte Fähnrich, “Science Diplomacy: Investigating the Perspective of Scholars on 
Politics–Science Collaboration in International Affairs,” Public Understanding of Science, 26, 
6 (2017): 688–703; John Krige, ed., How Knowledge Moves: Writing the Transnational History 
of Science and Technology (Chicago: University Press, 2019). Since 2012 the journal Science & 
Diplomacy has investigated diplomacy in science and technology in international relations. In 
view of the growing interest in this area, some have even spoken of a “diplomatic turn” in the 
history of science. See Maria Rentetzi, “A Diplomatic Turn in History of Science,” History of 
Science Society Newsletter, 47, 1 (2018): 12–14.
94. Stephen Twigge, “The Atomic Marshall Plan: Atoms for Peace, British Diplomacy and 
Civil Nuclear Power,” Cold War History, 16, 2 (2016): 213–230.
95. See Jens Niederhut, “‘Nichts erweckt den Ehrgeiz im Herzen mehr als die Posaune fremden 
Ruhmes’: Die Wissenschaftsbeziehungen der DDR zum Westen,” in Martin Aust and Daniel 
Schönpflug, eds., Vom Gegner lernen: Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. 
und 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007), 316–340.
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The asymmetries of power arising from nuclear development assistance 
sometimes had disadvantageous consequences for the superpowers. The export 
of nuclear technology could lead to political disappointment, because the states 
supplying the technology often pursued objectives that were incompatible with 
those of the recipient nations. Mara Drogan illustrates this vividly in her study of 
the Philippines and Brazil, explaining that at the end of the 1950s the U.S. funda‑
mentally reconsidered its nuclear diplomacy as a result of these divergences.
Individual countries cleverly knew how to manipulate the superpowers as they 
endeavored to outdo each other. One example was Yugoslavia. As Carla Konta 
shows in her essay, it leveraged the fact that both Washington and Moscow attached 
great geopolitical importance to its nuclear program to benefit from the dynamics of 
global market competition. Thanks to these maneuvers, Yugoslavia got the nuclear 
facilities and aid it needed from an assortment of countries, including, besides the 
two superpowers, France, Great Britain, Canada, Norway, and Czechoslovakia.
In his essay on the Romashka reactor, an experimental device developed for 
space satellites but never used, Fabian Lüscher argues that the project was crucial 
for the Soviet Union’s global “impression management.”96 The Romashka reactor 
promised Moscow spectacular triumphs on both the nuclear and cosmic frontiers. 
Alongside these strong competitive motivations, the Romashka project was also 
shaped by willingness to cooperate. The scientists responsible for the project repre‑
sented the Soviet Union at international working groups and symposia, such as the 
1955 International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva 
and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which have taken 
place regularly since 1957.
In contrast to nuclear diplomacy, which concentrates on relations between states, 
“nuclear internationalism” describes the process whereby scientists from different 
ideological systems shared important professional objectives and political values. 
As Fabian Lüscher, Roman Khandozhko, and Stefan Guth show in their essays, 
nuclear internationalism generated global epistemic communities whose univer‑
sally recognized expertise granted them authority. They defined urgent problems 
and pressured states to develop solutions within global intergovernmental organiza‑
tions.97 Agreements such as the 1963 ban on nuclear weapons testing and the 1967 
treaty on space exploration showed that despite all the nuclear saber rattling nuclear 
internationalists on both sides of the Iron Curtain used cooperation and reconcilia‑
tion to keep the Cold War’s potential for confrontation under control.98
96. Gestwa, Großbauten, 328.
97. Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1992); Mai´a K. Cross, “Rethinking Epistemic 
Communities Twenty Years later,” Review of International Studies, 39, 1 (2013): 137–160; 
Andrea Schneiker et al., eds., Transnational Expertise, Internal Cohesion and External Recog‑
nition of Expert Groups (Baden‑Baden: Nomos, 2018).
98. Kai‑Hendrik Barth, “The Politics of Seismology: Nuclear Testing, Arms Control, and the 
Transformation of a Discipline,” Social Studies of Science, 33, 5 (2003): 743–781; Toshihiro 
Higuchi, “Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing and the Debate on Risk Knowledge in Cold 
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Secrecy, publicity, and the framing of legacies
To be sure, efforts to see the Cold War less in terms of boundary and distinction and 
more in terms of the interactions between the blocs are expressions of today’s zeit‑
geist. Studies of the interrelationships between East and West prior to 1989 show 
that what would merge by the end of the 20th century had already been converging 
through powerful industrial and societal processes. Nevertheless, phrases such as 
“the nylon curtain”99 and “perforating the Iron Curtain”100 make it easy to forget 
that the Cold War, for all its moments of opening and transparency, was also char‑
acterized by calculated efforts to withhold information and technology, part of what 
historians have termed the “knowledge control regime.”101 Michael David‑Fox has 
thus described the Iron Curtain as a “semi‑permeable” membrane. Understanding 
the real dynamics of the Cold War, therefore, requires examining the steering power 
of state security apparatuses along with the interplay of intense publicity and strict 
secrecy in science and technology.102
In Soviet nuclear modernity, the urge to broadcast technological success existed 
in tension with the need to protect sensitive information.103 Even in the mid‑1970s, 
the handbook issued by the censorship organ Glavlit forbade almost every unautho‑
rized mention of nuclear technology.104 Likewise, references to the Soviet ministry 
supervising nuclear industry were strictly taboo. The ministry, whose official name 
War America, 1945–1963,” in John R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, eds., Environmental 
Histories of the Cold War (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 301–322; Susanne Schatten‑
berg, “Les limites du dicible: Les démêlés d’Andrej Saharov avec Hruščev et Brežnev,” in 
Cahiers du Monde russe 54, 3–4 (2013): 441–466.
99. György Péteri, “Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural 
Life of State‑Socialist Russia and East‑Central Europa,” Slavonica, 10 (2004): 113–123.
100. See Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds., Perforating the Iron Curtain: European 
Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985 (Copenhagen: Museum Tuscu‑
lanum Press, 2010).
101. On this concept, see Stephen Hilgartner, Reordering Life: Knowledge and Control 
in the Genomics Revolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017). See also Ronald E. Doel, 
“Scientists, Secrecy, and Scientific Intelligence: The Challenges of International Science in 
Cold War America,” in Jeroen Dongen, ed., Cold War Science, 9–35; Simone Turchetti, “A 
‘Need‑to‑Know‑More’ Criterion? Science and Information Security at NATO during the Cold 
War,” in ibid., 36–58; Walter Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty, and Science (Ithaca: Cornell Univer‑
sity Press, 2019).
102. See Michael David‑Fox, “The Iron Curtain as Semipermeable Membrane: Origins and 
Demise of the Stalinist Superiority Complex,” in Babiracki and Zimmer, eds., Cold War Cross‑
ings, 14–39.
103. See Oleg A. Bukharin, “The Cold War Atomic Intelligence Game, 1945–70,” Studies 
in Intelligence, 48, 2 (2004): 1–11. See also the many references to regimes of secrecy in 
Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb; Brown, Plutopia; Cochran, Norris and Bukharin, Making the 
Russian Bomb.
104. See Glavnoe upravlenie po okhrane gosudarstvennykh tain v pechati pri Sovete Ministrov 
SSSR (Glavlit SSSR), ed., Perechen´ svedenii, zapreshchennykh k opublikovaniiu v otkrytoi 
pechati, peredachakh po radio i televideniiu (Moskva 1976), available online at http://novy‑
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was the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, remained concealed behind its 
public fig leaf: the State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy.105
In the Soviet Union as elsewhere, the keeping and sharing of secret knowledge 
satisfied important societal functions besides protecting sensitive information.106 
Secrecy, by establishing an exclusive group of people in the know, generated both 
social cohesion and segregation.107 This applied not only to limits on the circulation 
of knowledge, which authorities regarded early on as an effective means of societal 
control.108 Rather, as practices of secrecy expanded ever further into other areas of 
life in the post‑Stalin era, they also developed popular and participative character‑
istics.109 In Severodvinsk, all residents, even those who were not involved in the 
production of nuclear submarines, drew social capital from the aura of secrecy that 
shrouded the city.110 In this way, the knowledge and imagination of secrets, along 
with their communication and concealment, became an indispensable part of the 
performance of Soviet life.
Galina Orlova, in her article, looks at “practices of simulation and dissimulation, 
the rhetoric of secretiveness or the strategies of hiding and revealing.”111 Speci‑
fically, she examines the secrecy practices of a radiochemical laboratory outside 
Moscow from the 1940s to the 1970s. She asks how concern about the control 
of nuclear knowledge both formed and deformed research. By determining how 
experiments were conducted, assessed, recorded and discussed, secrecy practices 
strongly influenced the production of scientific results, which in turn shaped the 
style of Soviet secrecy culture.
The social functions of shared or withheld secret knowledge also operated at 
the diplomatic level between states. The privileged sharing of expertise between 
105. See Schmid, Producing Power, 50–51; Maria Vasilieva, Soleils rouges: l’ambition 
nucléaire soviétique (P.: Éditions Rive Droite, 1999), 178–180.
106. The classic study is Georg Simmel, “The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies,” 
American Journal of Sociology, 11, 4 (1906): 441–498.
107. See Koen Vermeir and Daniel Margócsy, “States of Secrecy: An Introduction,” British 
Journal for the History of Science, 45, 2 (2012), 161.
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in the early Soviet Union. See Arlen V. Blium, “Forbidden Topics: Early Soviet Censorship 
Directives,” Book History, 1, 1 (1998): 268–282; Jonathan Bone, “Soviet Controls on the 
Circulation of Information in the 1920s and 1930s,” Cahiers du Monde russe, 40, 1–2 (1999): 
65–89; Jan Plamper, “Abolishing Ambiguity: Soviet Censorship Practices in the 1930s,” 
Russian Review, 60 (2001): 526–544; Brian Kassoff, “Glavlit, Ideological Censorship, and 
Russian‑Language Book Publishing, 1922–38,” Russian Review, 74 (2015): 69–96.
109. See Asif A. Siddiqi, “Cosmic Contradictions: Popular Enthusiasm and Secrecy in the 
Soviet Space Program,” in Andrews and Siddiqi, eds., Into the Cosmos, 47–76.
110. See Ekaterina Emeliantseva Koller, “The Cult of Secrecy as an Element of Community 
Cohesion and Commodity on Negotiations: The Case of the Closed City of Severodvinsk 
during the Cold War,” in Xenia Vytuleva, ed., Soviet Secret Cities During the Cold War (New 
York: Harriman Institute Columbia University, 2012), 10–13.
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Versus Secrecy? Historical and Historiographical Remarks,” British Journal for the History of 
Science, 45, 2 (2012): 165–188.
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the nuclear powers while excluding other states generated trust during periods of 
relaxed tension. The paradoxical concept of “secret sharing,” which emerged during 
the 1980s, describes strategies of concealment and revealment in the practices of 
secrecy.112 Khandozhko, Lüscher and Guth provide many interesting observations 
about such cooperation in their contributions to this issue.
Practices of secrecy are not the only vestiges of the Cold War that have awak‑
ened scholarly interest in recent years.113 The radioactive sites that nuclear moder‑
nity left behind represent the “radiant future” of a conflict that ended long ago.114 
The environmental pollution of the Cold War, much of which has yet to be cleaned 
up, makes vividly clear that the conflict produced many losers yet no victor.115
For this issue, Tatiana Kasperski takes the examples of the Mayak nuclear fuel 
plant in the Southern Urals and sites in the Artic to trace how thanks to Glasnost 
and other new forms of freedom in the 1980s and 90s NGOs such as the Bellona 
Foundation and Greenpeace began to take stock of the legacy of improperly stored 
nuclear waste in the Soviet Union. But even as international organizations worked 
to establish better disposal practices and protect the health of local residents, 
Russian officials, scientists and military leaders at the beginning of the 21st century 
began to “reframe” the problem of nuclear waste. As Kasperski explains, they no 
longer saw it as the horrible legacy of a regime that illegally dumped waste, devas‑
tating human beings and nature, but as the glorious heritage of a superpower. The 
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resulting emphasis on military and industrial strength has rewritten the historical 
significance of Soviet nuclear modernity and again made it into a resource for 
authoritarian techno‑ and geopolitics. This reframing has been to the detriment 
not only of environmental activists, who have stood accused of espionage by the 
Russian government, but also, and most of all, local residents who despite all the 
euphemisms and promises continue to live in radioactive environments. Moreover, 
the Russian government has reintroduced practices of concealment and secrecy that 
have significantly rolled back the progress made by nuclear glasnost. 
Susanne Bauer is another contributor to address the revealing continuities 
between the Soviet and post‑Soviet eras in her article on the nuclear testing grounds 
in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, where 118 atmospheric nuclear explosions took 
place between 1949 and 1989, including the first Soviet hydrogen bomb. Bauer 
examines four sets of epidemiological studies from the years 1958, 1978, 1992, 
and 2002 on the health effects of nuclear fallout. By comparing the relationship 
between knowledge and secrecy in each of those years, she finds that Semipalatinsk 
produced a form of risk analysis shaped by “Cold War rationality”116 that to this day 
has left many in the region exposed to radiation.
Expertise gained from international cooperation, as Bauer also argues, has failed to 
take into account local knowledge. The scientific authority enjoyed by the epistemic 
community of nuclear experts has restricted the participation of affected residents. 
Indeed, the justified concerns of local populations have recently been pathologized 
as “radiophobia,” a term coined by Soviet officials after the Chernobyl disaster.117 
Although the political regime of the Soviet Union ended in 1991, Soviet nuclear 
modernity – owing to its powerful lobbyists, expansive infrastructure, and firmly 
established practices – endured in the Russian Federation. Its diverse manifestations 
represent more than “the fragments of an empire”118 and “the ruins of socialism.”119 
Both for its advocates and its victims, Soviet nuclear modernity still forms the foun‑
dation of their social world – this is the ultimate message conveyed by the essays 
in this issue’s third section, as well as by many of the articles in the preceding two.
***
Looking back at the history of Soviet nuclear modernity helps explain the dual 
strategy that Russia has pursued over the past two decades: on the one hand, it has 
sought to leverage the threat represented by its newly developed classes of nuclear 
weapons; on the other, it has sought to gain international influence through the 
116. Paul Erickson et al., How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War 
Rationality (Chicago: University Press, 2013).
117. Magdalena E. Stawkowski, “Radiophobia had to be Reinvented,” Theory, Culture, 
Critique, 58, 4 (2017): 357–374.
118. Schlögel, Das sowjetische Jahrhundert, 27.
119. Swetlana Alexijewitsch, Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets (New York: Random 
House, 2016).
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construction and export of nuclear power plants.120 The history of Soviet nuclear 
modernity also helps account for the controversy surrounding the recently launched 
Akademik Lomonosov, Russia’s first floating nuclear power station, which nuclear 
lobbyists have touted as a technological marvel while nuclear critics have warned of 
a “floating Chernobyl.”121 From these fundamentally opposed positions we can trace 
a line back to Frederick Soddy’s early‑20th‑century prediction: nuclear power is still 
seen as having the potential both to improve the world and to bring about its demise.
The ten essays collected in this volume not only deepen our understanding of the 
history of Soviet nuclear modernity. They also pave new ways for scholarship to 
approach the multitude of interrelationships between discourse and material reality, 
knowledge and power and thus to say more about the heterogeneity of the social 
world in the Soviet and post‑Soviet eras. Grégory Dufaud and Larissa Zakharova’s 
recent coedited issue on the history of Soviet science was dedicated to this task. The 
following pages continue their work by using the methods of STS to further explore 
an important “frontier of history.”122
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